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Enforcing housing rights
How far can the courts go?
Lilian Chenwi
Ekurhuleni Municipality v Dada NO and 
Others Case No 280/2008(SCA) [Ekurhuleni 
Municipality case]
On 27 March 2009, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) overturned a High 
Court judgment ordering the Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality (the municipality) to 
buy land which had been unlawfully occupied 
by about 76 families (the occupiers). This case 
illustrates the difficulties that poor people face 
in accessing housing.
The facts
The matter arose when the respondent, the Islamic 
Dawah Movement Trust (the Trust), brought an 
application in the Witwatersrand Local Division of 
the High Court for the eviction of a group of people 
who had illegally occupied its property. The illegal 
occupiers came from an informal settlement on a 
neighbouring piece of land, which had become 
uninhabitable because of flooding and marshy 
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conditions caused by the summer rains (para 2). The 
application was brought under the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998, and the municipality was joined as 
the second respondent (para 3).
Issues before the High Court and its 
decision
In the main application at the High Court, the 
occupiers opposed the eviction. Although they 
conceded that their occupation of the land was 
unlawful, they argued that they had a bona fide 
(genuine) belief that an official of the municipality 
had authorised the occupation (para 4). They also 
argued that the municipality had not complied with 
its constitutional duties, which had contributed to the 
plight they were in.
In their counter-application, the occupiers argued 
that the municipality had a duty under section 26(2) 
of the Constitution of South Africa (the Constitution), 
to ‘devise and implement within its available resources 
a comprehensive and coordinated programme 
progressively to realise (the occupiers) right of access 
to adequate housing’. They added that the municipality 
had a duty to adopt reasonable measures to provide 
relief to them because they would be rendered 
homeless and were vulnerable to living in intolerable 
conditions if evicted (para 4).
The occupiers sought detailed relief in the form 
of a declaratory order defining the municipality’s 
constitutional obligations; an interim interdict against 
their eviction by the Trust; a supervisory order to ensure 
that the municipality complied with its constitutional 
obligations; and provisions regarding the resolution 
of any disagreements concerning the implementation 
of the court orders.
In reply to the argument that the municipality 
had done nothing to afford the occupiers access 
to housing and had no plans to improve their living 
conditions, the municipality presented ‘strategic 
frameworks’ and ‘integrated development plans’ to 
demonstrate that it was doing something to fulfil its 
section 26(2) obligations. It also cited the Housing 
Act 107 of 1997, the National Housing Programme, 
the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995, the 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998 and the regulations made under it as further 
evidence of the efforts it had already undertaken to 
progressively achieve the objects of the Constitution 
(para 5).
The High Court was not persuaded by the 
municipality’s arguments. In particular, it was 
dismayed by ‘the level of inactivity, with regard to 
the circumstances of the occupiers, shown by the 
municipality over the period between the lodging of 
the eviction application and the date of the hearing’ 
(para 10). The Court found this to amount to a breach 
of the municipality’s constitutional duty. It also found 
that ‘the courts had not gone far enough towards 
enforcing the rights in s 26 of the Constitution’ (para 
10). Section 26 of the Constitution guarantees the 
right of access to adequate housing and the right not 
to be evicted arbitrarily. The High Court directed the 
municipality to buy the land from the Trust at a price 
of R250 000 within thirty days from the date of the 
court order, and to provide essential services to the 
occupiers (para 11).
The decision of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal
The municipality appealed against the order of the 
High Court directing it to buy the land. The municipality 
did not appeal against the order to provide services 
because these, as noted by the SCA, had already 
been supplied or the municipality was already in the 
process of supplying them (para 12).
The SCA observed that the High Court had failed 
to consider the principles of judicial deference (paras 
10–11). Generally, deference implies that courts should 
respect policy decisions taken by the legislature, the 
executive or administrative agencies. The SCA was of 
the view that the order directing the municipality to 
purchase the land had not specifically been sought by 
the occupiers, and in making it, the judge had based 
it on a ‘pre-conceived notion … that it was time “to get 
things moving”’. In the words of the SCA (para 13),
[the High Court Judge] was not asked, in the papers or in 
the course of evidence, to make such an order and it was 
not rationally related to the evidence which was adduced 
concerning the municipality’s policies and plans and the 
extent of its immediate obligations to alleviate the plight 
of these particular occupiers. He plainly persuaded himself 
that it was time to cut across the principles of ‘progressive 
realisation’ of housing emphasized in the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court to which he had referred.
Although it agreed with the High Court’s conclusion 
that the municipality had not dealt with the problems 
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in directing the municipality to buy the land (this 
could be seen as problematic from a separation of 
powers perspective), its judgment did not say what 
the appropriate relief was in this particular case. An 
appropriate relief should take into consideration the 
interests of all those involved in the case, including the 
interests of the individual occupiers. Moreover, it must 
be effective in providing relief to the occupiers.
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The full judgment is available at www.saflii.
org/za/cases/ZASCA/2009/21.html.
of the occupiers with the measure of promptness 
that could reasonably have been expected of the 
municipality, the SCA held nevertheless that this could 
not justify the High Court’s order, ‘which was well 
outside the limits of [the Judge’s] power’ (para 14). The 
SCA held that the order directing the municipality to 
buy the land was not ‘appropriate relief’ and set it 
aside (para 14). The order directing the municipality 
to provide services to the occupiers was upheld.
Conclusion
This case shows that there are still questions as to the 
extent to which courts should show deference to the 
executive or administrative agencies in the area of 
socio-economic rights in general and housing rights 
in particular. While the SCA was arguably correct 
in holding that the High Court had gone overboard 
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